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• The evolution and stability of mutualism and cooperation 
• Continuous reactive investment games 
• Conditional, context-dependent cooperation 
• Partner choice mechanisms 
• Public Good Games with threshold effects 
• Division of labor in collective actions 
• Stability of microbiomes 
• Quorum sensing 
• Coexistence and cooperation in early replicator communities 
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Interacting 
individuals 
Direct reciprocity 
Reciprocity in humans: 
Economic exchanges 
Reciprocity in humans: 
food sharing among hunter-gatheres  
(Aché in Paraguay)  
Reciprocity in animals: 
food sharing in vampire bats  (Desmodus rotundus) 
Reciprocity in plants, fungi, bacteria: 
nutritional mutualisms 
Conditional mutualistic investments 
Rhizobium etli 
Analysis of the metabolic network 
• 387 reactions 
• 371 metabolites  
• 363 genes 
Conditional mutualistic investments 
Return 
investment 
Investment 
t >1, iterative game 
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The evolution and stability of conditional 
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The evolution and stability of conditional and 
unconditional investments 
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(closely) monomorphic population 
The investment cycle 
IBM simulation results 
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Investment cycle phases 
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Investment cycle and phase polymorphism 
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Phase of the investment cycle 
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Investment cycle and phase polymorphism 
Strategy diversity and phase polymorphism 
stabilizes cooperative investments 
Strategy diversity and phase polymorphism 
stabilizes cooperative investments 
Species A 
Species B  
Introducing spatial population structure in 
interspecific reciprocal investment game  
investments investments 
Spatial bubbles and the  
dynamic spatial mosaic structure 
Species A Species B 
Spatial bubbles and invasion dynamics 
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Summary 
• Cooperative investments are unstable for medium levels of 
reciprocity  
• Above a threshold, evolution drives strategy pairs through 
investment cycles temporarily 
• Mutation-generated polymorphism of strategies leads to 
phase diffusion along the investment cycle 
• Strategy diversity (polymorphism) stabilizes investment 
levels at the population level 
• Spatial mosaic structure further promotes mutualism stability, 
through a mechanism that is fundamentally different from the 
role of space in intraspecies cooperation 
 
Non-linear benefit functions  
and threshold effects in nature 
lions (Panthera leo) 
from Packer et al. (1990) 
and Stander (1992) 
Non-linear benefit functions  
and threshold effects in nature 
Harris’ Hawk (Parabuteo unicinctus) 
from Bednarz (1988) 
Brown-Necked Raven (Corvus ruficollis) 
Yosef  & Yosef  (2009) 
Non-linear benefit functions  
and threshold effects in nature 
killer whales (Orcinus orca) 
humpback whales (Megaptera novaengliae) 
from Leighton et al. (2004) 
Non-linear benefit functions  
and threshold effects in nature 
from Hibbing et al. (2010) 
Non-linear benefit functions  
and threshold effects in nature 
The Threshold Public Good Game 
Number of cooperators 
Score 
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Threshold Public Good Game 
Threshold value (T) 
Group size (N) 
Cost of cooperation (C(x)) 
Benefit of cooperation (b) 
focal CC CD DD 
C b-c b-c -c 
D b 0 0 
partners 
 Well–mixed population 
3 
1 
Individual willingness to cooperate (x) is a continuous, evolving trait. 
x = 1  always cooperate 
x = 0  always defect 
2 
following Bach et al. (2006) 
x -axis 
Polymorphic equlibria, bifurcation, hysteresis point 
1 
0 
0.5 
0 1 0.5 
x 
C(x) 
C(x)  – cost of cooperation 
T (threshold value) =2 
Stable fix points 
Instable fix points 
N (group size) = 3 
      4            5               6 
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Group size 
s  – steepness 
(n - T) * (- s) 
P (x) = 
1 
1 + e 
N= 5   
 
T=                 2 3 4                5 
number of cooperators in the group 
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Hysteresis point and the sigmoid return function 
Group cooperation and inter-group conflict 
Population structure and multilevel selection 
time 
x a 0 
1 1 
x a 0 
1 1 
x a 0 
1 1 
x a 0 
1 1 
N  =5 
T = 3 
(DD) (CC) 
(CD) (CD;DC) 
x  – willingness to cooperate during cooperative hunting 
a  – willingness to cooperate during group defence 
Summary 
• Non-linear payoff functions are more suited for many 
phenomena in nature 
• Stable polymorphism, coexistence of cooperators and 
defectors  
• Spatial population structure promotes cooperation 
• Division of labor in multi-public good games  
• Context dependent cooperation (cooperators vs. laggards) 
assuming intra-group cooperation and inter-group conflict 
• Not all non-cooperators are in fact „full” cheaters 
Spread of beneficial and parasitic microorganisms in 
host mediated microbiomes 
Non-linear dosage-effect function of antibiotics 
from Hibbing et al. (2010) 
Leaf-cutter ant microbiome 
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Dynamics of the antibiotics in the environment 
Intracellular dynamics of the antibiotics 
Reproduction rate of the producer (A+R+) 
Reproduction rate of parasite (A-R-) 
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Modelling antibiotics producing bacteria 
Antibiotics producing vs parasitic bacteria  
A+R+ 
A-R- 
Individuals              Antibiotics 
Antibiotics producing vs parasitic bacteria  
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Individuals              Antibiotics 
Antibiotics producing vs parasitic bacteria  

boza.gergely5@gmail.com 
boza@iiasa.ac.at 
 
